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PEMEGANG SAHAM KAWALAN DAN NILAI FIRMA: 
SUATU KAJIAN ATAS SYARIKAT AWAM TERSENARAI DI MALAYSIA 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Kajian sebelum ini mengenai hubungan antara pemilikan korporat dan nilai 
firma memberi tumpuan yang lebih ke atas pemilikan lembaga pengarah atau 
pemilikan secara langsung. Pemeriksaan ke atas hubungan ini berdasarkan 
pemilikan muktamad pemegang saham terbesar adalah masih terhad, terutamanya di 
negara membangun seperti Malaysia. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menyumbang 
kepada literatur yang sedia ada dengan memeriksa hubungan dari perspektif 
pemilikan muktamad. Penggunaan pemilikan muktamad yang meliputi pegangan 
saham secara langsung dan tidak langsung adalah lebih sesuai kerana majoriti firma-
firma awam disenaraikan di Malaysia adalah di bawah kawalan pemegang saham 
dominan dan sebilangan daripada firma-firma ini dimiliki oleh pemilik muktamad 
melalui pegangan saham tidak langsung oleh rantai atau rantaian beberapa firma-
firma. Dari sudut pandangan pemilikan muktamad, kajian ini menganalisis kesan 
pemegang saham kawalan kepada nilai firma bagi beberapa bidang struktur 
pemilikan korporat. Dengan menggunakan kaedah regresi data panel, 295 firma-
firma yang tersenarai di Papan Utama Bursa Malaysia yang meliputi tempoh dari 
tahun 2001 hingga 2009 telah diperiksa. Keputusan menyokong bahawa kehadiran 
pemegang saham kawalan menyumbang kepada nilai firma yang lebih baik. Ini 
menunjukkan bahawa kewujudan mereka adalah kompeten dalam mengurangkan 
masalah agensi dalam firma pemilikan tersebar. Ia menyarankan bahawa 
pembangunan undang-undang dan peraturan-peraturan juga harus melindungi 
insentif pihak yang mengawal kerana kehadiran mereka adalah penting kepada 
pertumbuhan firma. Keputusan-keputusan untuk mekanisme kawalan mendedahkan 
bahawa pemegang saham kawalan adalah lebih cenderung untuk merampas aset 
korporat melalui pelbagai rantaian kawalan berbanding dengan struktur piramid. 
Penemuan seterusnya mencerminkan bahawa penglibatan dalam pengurusan oleh 
pemegang saham kawalan memudaratkan nilai firma. Ujian selanjutnya 
menunjukkan bahawa pemilikan pengurusan mereka adalah tidak linear 
berhubungan dengan nilai firma. Ini membayangkan bahawa set garis panduan dan 
peraturan-peraturan yang berbeza boleh diperkenalkan pada tahap pemilikan 
pengurusan yang berbeza dalam usaha untuk meminimumkan kesan negatif 
pemilikan pengurusan pemegang saham kawalan. Dari segi identiti pemilikan, 
keputusan menunjukkan bahawa pemegang saham kawalan kerajaan dan asing 
mempunyai kesan positif kepada nilai firma. Selain itu, firma kawalan asing 
berprestasi mengatasi firma-firma jenis yang lain. Akhir sekali, keputusan 
menunjukkan bahawa kesan buruk daripada penglibatan dalam pengurusan dan 
mekanisme kawalan adalah lebih ketara bagi firma-firma asing. Ia menampakkan 
bahawa kelebihan firma kawalan asing seperti kepakaran pengurusan tidak lagi 
berkesan dalam mengurangkan masalah agensi. Sebaliknya, ia bertukar menjadi 
faktor-faktor yang menggalakkan pemegang saham kawalan untuk mengekstrak 
manfaat persendirian. 
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CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER AND FIRM VALUE: 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON MALAYSIAN PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Previous studies on corporate ownership and firm value relationship focused 
much on board ownership or direct ownership. The examination on the relationship 
based on ultimate ownership of the largest shareholder is still limited, especially in a 
developing country like Malaysia. This study seeks to contribute to the existing 
literature by examining the relationship from the perspective of ultimate ownership. 
The use of ultimate ownership which covers direct and indirect shareholdings should 
be more appropriate as majority of the publicly listed firms in Malaysia are under 
the control of dominant shareholders and a number of the firms are owned by the 
ultimate owner through indirect shareholdings by a chain or several chains of firms. 
From the standpoint of ultimate ownership, this study analyzed the effects of 
controlling shareholder on firm value for several areas of corporate ownership 
structure. Using the method of panel data regression, 295 firms listed on the Main 
Board of Bursa Malaysia covering the period from 2001 to 2009 were examined. 
The findings support that presence of controlling shareholder contributes to better 
firm value. This indicates that their existence is competent in mitigating the agency 
problem in dispersed ownership firm. It suggests that the development of the rules 
and regulations should also protect the incentives of the controlling party as their 
presence is important to the growth of the firm. The results for control mechanisms 
reveal that controlling shareholder is more likely to expropriate corporate assets 
through multiple control chains than pyramidal structure. The next findings reflect 
that involvement in management by the controlling shareholder is detrimental to 
firm value. Further test shows that their managerial ownership is non-linearly related 
to firm value. This implies that different set of guidelines or rules could be 
introduced at different levels of managerial ownership in order to minimize the 
negative impact of managerial ownership of the controlling shareholder. In terms of 
ownership identity, the results indicate that the government and foreign controlling 
shareholder have positive impact on firm value. Besides that, foreign controlled 
firms outperform other types of firms. Finally, the results show that the adverse 
effect of involvement in management and control mechanisms are more pronounce 
for foreign firms. It seems that the advantages of foreign controlled firms such as 
managerial expertise are no longer effective in mitigating the agency problems. In 
contrast, it in turn becomes the factors that encourage the controlling shareholder to 
extract private benefits. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background of the Study 
 
Financial scandals, corporate collapses or economic crisis have often served 
as a drive for countries around the world to strengthen their corporate governance 
system (Mallin, 2009). This can be seen in a number of high profile corporate 
collapses and financial scandals such as the collapse of Barings Bank (one of the 
oldest established bank in the United Kingdom (UK)), the downfall of Enron (the 
largest bankruptcy in the United States (US) history) and the financial scandals of 
Royal Ahold (the third largest food retailer in the world). Basically, the failures of 
these firms were due to the weaknesses in their corporate governance such as poor 
internal control system and the lack of accountability of directors (Mallin, 2009). 
For Asia-Pacific region, the collapse of many of the markets in Asia-Pacific 
countries during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 could be seen as the key incident 
that leads to the awareness of the people to the importance of corporate governance 
in the region. The market or particularly corporate collapses have had negative 
impact not only to the shareholders and stakeholders but also to the economy as a 
whole. Even though many prevention steps have been taken to avoid such corporate 
collapses and financial scandals, there is no guarantee that it will not happen again. 
Corporate governance will certainly continue to play a very important role to stop or 
at least minimize the possibilities of such collapses and scandals to occur. 
 
The development of corporate governance is a worldwide occurrence. It is a 
wide area which covers legal, ownership, cultural and other structural differences 
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(Mallin, 2009). Consequently, there is no one standard corporate governance 
practice that fits all countries or all firms. Under different conditions, different form 
of corporate governance practice and structure is needed (Loh & Mat Zin, 2007). For 
instance, the differences in legal structure are having essential influence on 
corporate ownership structure. Countries which provide good legal protection to 
corporate shareholders’ rights (including minority shareholders’ rights) tend to have 
dispersed ownership structure, while countries which have weak legal protection to 
shareholders’ rights tend to have concentrated ownership structure (Mallin, 2009). 
Therefore, the corporate governance practice and structure should be design in the 
way that fit to the national needs of a firm and the country’s regulatory framework 
(Loh & Mat Zin, 2007).  
 
According to Singam (2003), the most important factors that contribute to a 
sound corporate governance system are corporate ownership structure, composition 
and operation of the firms. As one of the key determinants of corporate governance, 
corporate ownership structure and composition has become a popular research area 
by researchers around the world. Although in terms of practicality, policy makers 
are the ones who responsible to create and improve the policies, the findings from 
various studies by researchers in this area are essential to provide inputs in helping 
to create a good corporate governance system. Viewing the significant influence of 
corporate ownership structure on corporate governance, it is crucial for us to have a 
clear understanding about the ownership structure of a firm. Hence, detail studies on 
various aspects of corporate ownership structure were performed in this study.  
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Previous studies found that concentrated ownership structure is the most 
common form of ownership structure around the world (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002). The 
statement made by Berle and Means (1932) pertaining to the universe of diffused 
ownership structure is more applicable to the UK and the US and not to many other 
countries. The universe of the concentrated ownership serves as a drive for a careful 
analysis on the impact of concentrated ownership structure on firm value. The 
relationship between ownership and firm value is often traced back to the work of 
Berle and Means (1932). According to them, the increase in firm size as a result of 
expansion in the business will lead to the separation of ownership and control in the 
firm. They argued that the separation of ownership and control in a firm will have 
certain degree of influence on firm value and the maximization of profits is no 
longer guaranteed. As the original owners’ shareholding falls, so does their incentive 
to exert effort to generate shareholders’ wealth. An important factor that may bring 
to the negative impact of firm value is connected to agency problems. The work of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) are essential to explain 
this relationship. It can be a problem as the agent (the managers or directors) may 
not always act in the best interests of the principal (the shareholders). The agent 
might misuse their power for personal financial or other advantages. In general, the 
agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is set from the background of the 
separation of ownership and control as illustrated by Berle and Means (1932).  
 
In firms where the ownership structure is concentrated, the above problem is 
usually mitigated by the existence of large shareholder or controlling shareholder 
who is having more interest to monitor management. However, problems arise when 
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these shareholders expropriate the interest of the minority shareholders as they are 
having more power to control the firm. Empirical studies provided mixed results and 
arguments concerning the effect of ownership concentration and firm value. One 
group of studies may provide support that concentrated ownership structure has 
positive impact on firm value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; 
Andres, 2008), while another group of researchers may offer support that the impact 
is negative, especially when the controlling shareholders controlled the firms 
through indirect shareholdings such as pyramidal structure (Lease, McConnell, & 
Mikkelson, 1984; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 
2002;  Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). Thus, previous studies 
are still unable to provide clear-cut evidence on the said relationship. Generally, the 
potential for agency problems to occur is there, regardless of the types of ownership 
structure. The matter of concern here will be the impact of different ownership 
structure on firm value and the existence of an optimal ownership structure that 
minimizes agency costs.  
 
This study addresses the above matters by analyzing the impact of ownership 
structure on performance of listed firms in Malaysia. In particular, it focused on the 
effects of the existence of the controlling shareholder on firm value as the ownership 
structure in this country is highly concentrated (Claessens et al., 2000; Mat Nor & 
Sulong, 2007; Mallin, 2009). Various important aspects of ownership structure or 
characteristics that could have impact on firm value such as control mechanisms, 
managerial ownership and identity of controlling shareholder have also been 
covered in this study.   
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1.1 Problem Statement 
 
A sound corporate governance system is crucial to the well being of a firm 
especially to its shareholders and stakeholders. It is not just important for the 
individual firm, but also serves as an important element in maintaining a sound 
financial system and a strong economy. As one of the most important mechanisms 
of corporate governance, ownership structure may influences and detects the 
corporate direction and performance (Loh & Mat Zin, 2007). Performance measure 
on the other hand is one of the important issues pertaining to the survival of a 
company. However, the relationship between ownership structure and firm value is 
still debatable as there is no consensus among the findings from previous studies. 
Thus, clearer understanding of various aspects of ownership structure is important to 
access their impact on firm value.  
 
In Malaysia, majority of the publicly listed companies are under the control 
of dominant shareholders. The work of Claessens et al. (2000) shows that most of 
the publicly listed companies in this country were dominated by family owned firms. 
This is followed by government and foreign owned firms. In a concentrated 
ownership environment, large shareholders or controlling shareholders are expected 
to play an important role in monitoring management. However, these shareholders 
and their management team may not be responsive to minority shareholders’ rights. 
Hence, the potential agency problem in this country is largely between the large 
shareholders and the minority shareholders. There is not so much issue here 
regarding agency problem between the management and the owner. The agency 
problem might become worst when there is a control mechanism in place. The use of 
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control mechanisms such as cross-shareholdings and pyramidal structure in a firm 
might make the situation more complicated. This is due to the owner might use these 
structures to control firm’s resources from behind without needing to maintain a 
high direct ownership in that firm (Amin Nordin, Mat Nor, & McGowan Jr, 2010).  
 
Another important factor that might have an impact on firm value is its 
ownership composition. It is crucial to identify who controls the firm as different 
types of controlling persons may have different impact on the firm’s governance 
structure and firm value (Loh & Mat Zin, 2007). For example, in family controlled 
firms, the controlling owner would be more interested to involve in managerial and 
control activities. Conversely, the institutional shareholder who owned a large 
proportion of equity might not be interested to involve in the management of the 
firm and might be only be concerned about the profits of the firm. Similarly, in 
foreign and government owned firm, foreign investors and the government might 
have different interests. The differences in interests give raise to the question of 
whether the equity owners are playing their monitoring role (Loh & Mat Zin, 2007).  
 
Given all this, a well-established legal infrastructure and strict enforcement 
would play an important role in protecting the interest of shareholders as well as the 
stakeholders, even though it might be difficult to ensure or prove that the dominant 
shareholder or the directors’ interest are parallel with minority shareholders or other 
stakeholders. Thus, an insight study of various aspects of ownership structure and 
corporate control in the country is important to provide inputs in helping to achieve 
the objective.  
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Different aspects of ownership structure and the potential agency problems 
in this country give rise to the motivation to conduct this study. A more important 
factor that drives to the analysis in this study is that there are still limited studies in 
the area of corporate ownership which focus on ultimate ownership of the largest 
shareholder, especially in developing countries such as Malaysia (Song, 2007). In 
Malaysia, studies of corporate ownership mainly focused on board ownership or 
direct ownership (Mat Nor, Redzuan, & Mohd Said, 1999; Ali & Sanda, 2001; 
Ahmad, Ishak & Manaf, 2003, Mat Nor and Sulong, 2007; Sulong and Mat Nor, 
2008). In a concentrated ownership environment, it is crucial to study the effects 
from the standpoint of ultimate ownership as a majority of the publicly listed firms 
in this country are under the control of dominant shareholders or the ultimate owners 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Song, 2007). The ultimate owner is expected to be the 
person that has vital influence on the decision-making processes and the operations 
of the business and one who can directly affect firm value. This study seeks to 
contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of controlling shareholder in 
various firms’ ownership structures on firm value from the perspective of ultimate 
ownership. 
 
As stated above, previous studies often used direct ownership in the analysis. 
According to Wiwattanakantang (2001), this is due to the ownership data used in 
most of the studies came from the databases that provide only the direct 
shareholdings of the major shareholders. It is also observed that although some of 
the studies are using ownership information from the annual reports which provide 
more ownership information, the analysis is still focusing on direct ownership. This 
might be due to the difficulties and time constraints in tracing the indirect ownership 
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data. The use of direct shareholdings might not reflect the actual situation in 
Malaysia as a number of the firms are controlled through indirect shareholdings by a 
chain of firms that are privately held (Song, 2007). Following La Porta et al. (1999), 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Song (2007), the ultimate owner of the largest 
shareholder is traced to provide a clearer picture that closely reflects the impact of 
controlling shareholder or ultimate owner on the value of Malaysian-listed firms. 
The ultimate ownership is based on control rights of the ultimate owner that consist 
of direct and indirect shareholdings (Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2012).  
 
An important issue regarding ultimate ownership is the use of control 
mechanisms such as pyramidal structure, cross-shareholdings and multiple control 
chains which separate the cash flow and control rights. Empirical evidence 
consistently show that the used of control mechanisms have negative impact on firm 
value (Faccio et al., 2001; Claessens et al., 2002;  Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Cronqvist 
& Nilsson, 2003). However, studies on control mechanisms in Malaysia are very 
limited. The only local paper that empirically investigated the effects of pyramidal 
structure is by Amin Nordin et al. (2010). However, their study is mainly focus on 
the effects of pyramidal structure on firm capital structure. For multiple control 
chains, none of the studies either local or non-local have empirically examining the 
effects based on this mechanism besides the discussion made by Faccio and Lang 
(2002). Thus, this study will fills up the gap by examining the impact of pyramidal 
structure and multiple control chains on firm value. 
 
The effects of involvement in management by the controlling shareholders 
and their managerial ownership on firm value are examined as the understanding of 
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the relationship based on ultimate ownership in this country is still limited. Hence, 
the managerial ownership in this study is different from other studies as it is defined 
as the ownership of the controlling shareholder who involved in the management of 
the firm rather than directors’ ownership. 
 
The impacts of identity of controlling shareholders are also being assessed in 
this study. As different identities of the owner could have different impacts on firm 
value, it is believed that the involvement in management and the use of control 
mechanisms by different identity of controlling shareholder might have different 
effects on firm value. Thus, the examination on the interaction effects between these 
ownership characteristics are covered in this study. As far as concern, no previous 
study has looked into the interaction effects between identity of controlling 
shareholder and control mechanisms. The outcomes of the interaction effects are 
important as they could provide some implications to us on how the combination 
between these firms’ characteristics affects firm value. It may provide valuable 
information to the regulators or policy makers in their process of developing a sound 
corporate governance system.      
 
 Lastly, the entire analyses in this study are conducted using panel data, rather 
than cross-sectional data which are commonly used in the previous studies. That 
means the use of panel data analysis in examining the effects of ownership structure 
on firm value based on ultimate ownership is rare especially in Malaysian context. 
The panel data analysis enables us to study the behaviors of the sample firms over 
time. The combination of cross-section and time series data in panel regression 
models can improve the accuracy or quality of the results that would be impossible 
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if using cross-section or time series analysis (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Thus, it helps 
to enhance the quality of the findings in this study.  
       
1.2 Research Questions 
 
The following questions are raised in order to address the research problems in this 
study. 
1) Does presence of controlling shareholder has an impact on firm value? 
2) Do control mechanisms have an impact on firm value? 
3) Does involvement in management by controlling shareholder have an impact 
on firm value? 
4) What is the relationship between the managerial ownership of the controlling 
shareholder and firm value? 
5) Does identity of controlling shareholder have an impact on firm value? 
6) Which type of firm is having best performance? 
7) Do the interaction effects between involvement in management and identity of 
controlling shareholder have an impact on firm value? 
8) Do the interaction effects between control mechanisms and identity of 
controlling shareholder have an impact on firm value? 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The above research questions dictate the needs of the study to achieve the following 
objectives. Specifically, the first and the second objectives are related to the first two 
research questions. The third objective is connected to the third and fourth research 
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questions where the impact of involvement in management by controlling 
shareholder is addressed by two methods. Firstly, performance comparison is made 
between firms where the controlling shareholder is involved and not involved in 
management. Secondly, the impact of involvement in management is studied using 
the absolute measure of managerial ownership of the controlling shareholder. The 
fourth objective is associated to the fifth and sixth research questions. Lastly, the 
fifth objective is interconnected to the last two research questions.      
 
1) To determine the effects of presence of controlling shareholder on firm value. 
2) To determine the effects of control mechanisms on firm value. 
3) To determine the effects of involvement in management by controlling 
shareholder on firm value. 
4) To determine the effects of identity of controlling shareholder on firm value. 
5) To determine the interaction effects among involvement in management by 
controlling shareholder and control mechanisms with identity of controlling 
shareholder on firm value. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
This study is important in providing a better understanding on the ownership 
structure and control in a developing country like Malaysia. The area of study which 
covers important aspects of ownership structure such as control mechanisms, 
managerial ownership and identity of controlling shareholder will provide important 
information and knowledge to investors, researchers as well as policy makers or the 
government to have a clearer picture on the ownership structure, corporate control 
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and their effects on firm value in this country. The ownership in this study is defined 
based on control rights of the largest shareholder as there are a number of firms in 
Malaysia are controlled indirectly by the owners through control mechanisms. Thus, 
the findings are expected to be closely reflects the actual ownership and corporate 
control in the country.  
 
The findings of the study provide important implications or information 
about the condition of ownership structure that has higher potential for conflict of 
interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The insight 
studies on the effects of different aspects of ownership are important to generate 
such information. This may serve as an input to the government, regulatory 
authorities or policy makers in the process of strengthening the areas of regulation, 
particularly with regards to ownership distribution that have potential for agency 
problem to occur. Hence, it may help the authorities or policy makers in their effort 
to produce a more comprehensive and effective legal infrastructure which in turn 
will enhance the corporate governance system. The improvement in legal 
infrastructure and corporate governance system will help to increase investor 
confidence and strengthen the equity market in the country. 
 
Investors may be benefited from the results of this study. The findings may 
provide some signal to the potential or existing investors about the potential risk of 
their interest being expropriated by the controlling shareholder for their investment 
in a particular firm based on the type or combination of different aspects of 
ownership structure of the firm as covered in the study.  
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This study also contribute to the existing literatures as the analysis of 
ownership structure from the perspective of ultimate ownership and the method of 
analysis which used panel data is still limited in this country. The theoretical 
contribution includes enhancing the knowledge of the agency theory where the 
corporate ownership is concentrated. It particularly provides further evidence in 
explaining the agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders in the country. Besides that, it also provides new evidence and 
knowledge towards the agency problems based on different aspects of ownership 
structure which includes control mechanisms, managerial ownership of the 
controlling shareholder and identity of controlling shareholder.    
 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms 
 
There are several important key terms that are used regularly throughout this 
study. Therefore, it is important to have a common understanding on the concepts or 
meanings of these key terms. These commonly used terms include alignment effects, 
cash flow rights, control rights, controlling shareholder, entrenchment effects, family 
controlled firm, foreign controlled firm, government controlled firm, managerial 
ownership, multiple control chains, pyramidal structure and ultimate owner. 
 
1.5.1 Alignment Effects 
 
Alignment effects refer to the effects that arise when there is an alignment of 
interest between shareholders and managers or controlling shareholders and other 
minority shareholders (Florackis, Kostakis, & Ozkan, 2009). The alignment of 
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interest between these parties is perceived to have positive influence on firm value 
(Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Short & Keasey, 
1999; Cui & Mak, 2002; Davies, Hillier, & McColgan, 2005; Florackis et al., 2009). 
This is because they are expected to work together with the same objectives to 
ensure that their firms are performing well in the long run and bring benefits to all of 
them.   
 
1.5.2 Cash Flow Rights 
 
Cash flow rights refer to the rights that arise through the purchase of shares 
(Claessens et al., 2000). It is also refers to as actual shareholdings of a particular 
shareholder. The owner of the shares is entitling to claims on cash payouts or 
dividend. The total cash flow rights are equal to the sum of the direct and indirect 
cash flow rights (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Amin Nordin et al., 
2010; Bae, Baek, & Liu, 2012; Francoeur, Amar, & Rakoto, 2012). Direct cash flow 
rights are the direct shareholdings which held under the name of a shareholder, 
while indirect cash flow rights are the shareholdings of a shareholder through 
indirect ownership or intermediary entities. The indirect shareholdings arise when 
one party (first party) owns shares of another entity (second entity) which owns 
shares of a third entity. The first party in this case is said to have indirect 
shareholding in the third entity through its shareholding in the second entity. The 
indirect cash flow rights are obtained by multiplying the cash flow rights along the 
chain of ownership (Boubaker & Sami, 2011; Bae et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2012). 
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1.5.3 Control Rights 
 
Control rights are referring to the voting rights of a shareholder. The owners 
of control rights are having the rights to vote for board of directors and influence or 
dictate decisions that require approval from shareholders. The aggregate control 
rights of a shareholder is the summation of his direct and indirect control rights 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Song, 2007; 
Amin Nordin et al., 2010; Bae et al., 2012; Francoeur et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2012). 
Similar to the definition of direct cash flow rights as in section 1.5.2, the direct 
control rights are referring to the direct shareholdings of a shareholder. Indirect 
control rights are referring to the percentage of shareholdings at the weakest link 
within a chain of ownership (Bae et al., 2012; Francoeur et al., 2012). In the case 
where a firm is not controlled by the owner through indirect shareholdings, the 
control rights of the owner are equal to the cash flow rights.      
 
1.5.4 Controlling Shareholder 
 
Controlling shareholder in this study is defined as a person who owns at least 
33% of company’s voting shares or control rights. The definition of the controlling 
shareholder is based on the definition by Bursa Malaysia’s Main Market Listing 
Requirement (Bursa Malaysia, 2009a). This should be more appropriately reflects 
the corporate ownership and control in Malaysia as it is defined based on the 
economic or legal frameworks of the country (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). At this 
level of ownership, a shareholder could have significant influence on corporate 
decisions. 
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1.5.5 Entrenchment Effects 
 
Entrenchment effects are referring to the effects that arise when the interest 
between shareholders and managers or controlling shareholders and other minority 
shareholders are not aligned (Florackis et al., 2009). The conflict of interest between 
these parties is perceived to have negative influence on firm value (Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Short & Keasey, 1999; Cui & Mak, 2002; 
Davies et al., 2005; Florackis et al., 2009). This is due to the managers or controlling 
shareholders might exert insufficient effort in monitoring management and extract 
private benefits from the firms in the expense of the interest of shareholders or 
minority shareholders.  
 
1.5.6 Family Controlled Firm 
 
A firm is defined as family controlled firm when it is owned by a controlling 
shareholder (as defined in section 1.5.4) whose identity is either an individual or a 
group of family members (La Porta et al., 1999; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Claessens 
et al., 2002). In this study, family members are defined based on the definition by 
Bursa Malaysia’s Main Market Listing Requirement. Following this, spouse, parent, 
child, sibling and relatives of in-laws in relation to a person are defined as family 
members (Bursa Malaysia, 2009a). The family members are grouped together as a 
single shareholder as they might vote as a coalition.    
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1.5.7 Foreign Controlled Firm 
 
A firm is defined as foreign controlled firm when it is owned by a controlling 
shareholder (as defined in section 1.5.4) whose identity is a foreign investor. This 
includes foreign family and foreign corporations (Wiwattanakantang, 2001).  
 
1.5.8 Government Controlled Firm 
 
A firm is defined as government controlled firm when it is owned by a 
controlling shareholder (as defined in section 1.5.4) whose identity is the federal or 
state government (Wiwattanakantang, 2001).  
 
1.5.9 Managerial Ownership 
 
Managerial ownership in this study is refers to the ownership percentage of 
the controlling shareholder (as defined in section 1.5.4) who involved in the 
management of the firm. This is different from the common definition of managerial 
ownership as shown in the previous studies where it is defined as board ownership 
or the shareholdings of the managers. For family firm, involvement in management 
is identified when at least one of the family members are holding firm’s top 
management position (Claessens et al., 2000; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Firm’s top 
management means holding a position as the managing director, CEO, or executive 
director of a firm. For foreign firm, involvement in management is identified when 
there is at least one member of the foreign controlling family or employee of the 
foreign controlling corporation holds any position in the top management of the firm 
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(Claessens et al., 2000). For government firm, the involvement in management is 
determined when: (1) the managing director, CEO or any executive director of the 
firm is at the same time holding top management position of the controlling 
shareholder's entity, or (2) the managing director, CEO or any executive director of 
the firm is a nominee director of the controlling shareholder. These criteria are set to 
allow for the examination on the impact of government’s involvement in 
management. This is relevant to the environment in Malaysia as a large proportion 
of listed firms in the country are government controlled firms. 
 
1.5.10 Multiple Control Chains 
 
Multiple control chains is refers to a kind of ownership structure where an 
ultimate owner owns a firm through a number of channels or a multitude of control 
chains (Faccio & Lang, 2002). In this study, a firm is defined as control through 
multiple control chains when the ultimate owner as stated in section 1.5.12 owned 
the firm through more than one chain and each of the chain is having at least 5% of 
control rights (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Thus, the total control rights of the ultimate 
owner for this kind of firm are obtained by horizontally adding up the control rights 
of the ultimate owner from every chain. 
 
1.5.11 Pyramidal Structure 
 
Pyramidal structure is refers to a group of firms whose ownership structure 
shows a top-down chain of control with the ultimate owner positioned at the top of 
the structure (Amin Nordin et al., 2010). Following La Porta et al. (1999), 
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Wiwattanakantang (2001), and Amin Nordin et al. (2010), a firm is defined as 
control through pyramidal structure when the structure of the firm fulfilled all the 
following three criteria: (1) the ultimate owner as defined in section 1.5.12 owned 
the firm indirectly through a firm or a chain of firms, (2) at least one firm in the 
chain is publicly listed, and (3) the inter-company links along the chain is over a 
threshold of 33%.  
 
1.5.12 Ultimate Owner 
 
Ultimate owner is refers to the largest shareholder of a firm based on his 
control rights as stated in section 1.5.3 (Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Song, 2007; King 
& Santor, 2008; Silva & Majluf, 2008). In a free-standing firm where the firm is free 
from control mechanism, particularly pyramidal structure (as defined in section 
1.5.11) and multiple control chains (as defined in section 1.5.10), the ultimate owner 
is the person who has the largest direct shareholdings of the firm. In the case where 
the ultimate owner owned 33% or more of control rights, the ultimate owner will 
also be defined as the controlling shareholder (as defined in section 1.5.4) of the 
firm.   
 
1.6 Organization of the Chapters 
  
This thesis is structured in five chapters. Chapter 1 describes background of 
the study, problem statement, research questions, research objectives, significance of 
the study, definitions of key terms and organization of the chapters in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literatures related to this study and develops the respective 
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hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents the research design, measurement of variables, 
statistical methodology and model specification. Chapter 4 reports results and 
provide the discussion on the findings of the study. Chapter 5 presents the 
conclusion and implication of the results. Limitation of the study and suggestions for 
future research are also discussed at the end of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the related literature that leads to the formulation of the 
hypotheses. The areas of literature review include theoretical aspects of the research 
and empirical evidences from previous studies. Section 2.1 is related to the theory of 
agency and corporate ownership structure. Section 2.2 is related to corporate 
ownership and control in Malaysia. Sections 2.3 to 2.6 will focus on various aspects 
of ownership structure and their effects to firm valuation. In particular, it includes 
the controlling shareholder and firm value, control mechanisms and agency costs, 
involvement in management by controlling shareholder and identity of controlling 
shareholder. The hypotheses of this study were presented at the end of each section 
beginning from section 2.3 to section 2.6.    
 
2.1 The Theory of Agency and Corporate Ownership Structure 
 
The theory that is very essential when dealing with the area of corporate 
ownership structure is the theory of agency. A large number of previous works that 
has been constructed in this area is based on the theoretical framework of principal-
agent as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Basically, this theory suggests 
that the problem of agency arises whenever the owner (the principal) of a firm hires 
another party (the agent) to run the firm. The major challenge here is how to ensure 
that the agent act in the best interest of the principal. Although much of the agency 
theory focused on the principal-agent problems, it is important to aware that there is 
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another type of agency relationship that has significant connection with corporate 
ownership structure. This agency relationship is between the major shareholder and 
the minority shareholders. It is commonly referred to as the agency problem in the 
environment of concentrated corporate ownership structure where the agency 
conflict arises when the interest of the major shareholders are misalign with the 
interest of other minority shareholders. It is also called the principal-principal 
conflicts in several recent studies (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008; 
Chen & Young, 2010; Jiang & Peng, 2010).  
 
In order to provide a clearer understanding on the concept of corporate 
ownership and control and its relationship with the agency theory, this section is 
further divided into two parts, namely section 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 which review the 
literatures related to dispersed and concentrated ownership structure and corporate 
control and their relationship with the two types of agency conflicts as stated above.  
 
2.1.1 Dispersed Ownership Structure  
 
Ownership structure is viewed as a very important corporate governance 
mechanism to explain the corporate control of a firm. Generally, the structure of 
corporate ownership can be classified into two categories, which are dispersed and 
concentrated ownership structures. The dispersed ownership structure is a 
characteristic of firms in the UK and the US. The corporations in these countries 
seldom have dominant shareholders and the shareholders usually owned a very small 
percentage of firm’s shares. The condition that leads to the formation of the 
dispersed ownership structure is greatly related to the separation of corporate 
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ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932). The developments of the dispersed 
ownership structure and its relationship with the separation of ownership and control 
as well as the related agency conflict are discussed in the following two parts.  
 
2.1.1(a) The Separation of Ownership and Control 
 
According to Berle and Means (1932), as countries industrialized and 
markets developed, there will be a growing dispersion of ownership. As a firm 
growth and expand its business, the demand for capital will increase in order to 
support the growth. Unfortunately, the ability of the owner to support the increasing 
demand for capital is limited. Therefore they have to accumulate the monetary 
support from outside investors. This leads to the growing dispersion of ownership. 
 
 This argument is supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), where they 
contended that there is an inverse relationship between firm size and ownership 
concentration. As firm size becomes larger, its ownership will be more diffuse. They 
explained that there are two reasons for the existence of the dispersed ownership. 
Firstly, the proportion of ownership in a larger firm after expansion will be more 
costly. This is because the total value of a firm after expansion to larger size through 
injection of additional capital has become larger. Thus, a shareholder needs to top-
up his investment in the firm after the expansion if he wishes to maintain the same 
proportion of ownership for before and after the expansion. Therefore, it has a 
negative impact on concentration of ownership. Secondly, for a given degree of 
control, it generally requires a smaller share ownership when the firm size is larger. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) contended that it is costly for the owners to maintain a high 
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percentage of shares in their firms as their personal portfolio will then be less 
diversified. They further argued that the owner will maintain a high proportion of 
equity only if the future cash flow of the firm is expected to be higher than its 
current value. 
 
The dispersed ownership structure has leads to the separation of ownership 
and control of a firm, where the shareholders own the firm and managers control the 
firm. The situation comes about as there are too many investors who own the firms 
and they could not jointly run the company or involve in the daily decision making 
process needed in the operations (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007). Shareholders are not 
interested to be involved in the management activities as it is too costly for them as 
compared to their small proportion of investment in the firm. Hence, managers will 
be hired to perform the task for them.  
 
2.1.1(b) The Separation of Ownership and Control and the Agency Conflict 
 
The separation of ownership and control between the principal (owner) and 
the agent (manager) can be a problem. This agency relationship could raise 
drawbacks to the owner which are mainly associated with the opportunistic behavior 
or the self-interest of the manager. In particular, the owner is facing a risk of interest 
expropriation by their manager as the manager may not act in the best interest of the 
owner. The manager may abuse the power given by the owner in gaining financial or 
other benefits from the firm. Besides that, the manager who involve in the 
management of the firm is mastering more information about the firm as compared 
to the owner. Practically, this information asymmetry problem put the owner at a 
